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At an early point in most courses Mavis Reimer 
teaches in young people’s texts and cultures, she 
sets an assignment in which students are asked to 
bring to class at least one recent item about children 
clipped from a newspaper or magazine, transcribed 
from a television program, downloaded from a 
website, photocopied from a textbook, or found on 
an advertising flyer. Requests for clarification of the 
assignment typically are queries about other possible 
sources of information; no one appears to find the 
terminology of “children” difficult or questionable. 
Working in small groups, students are asked to unearth 
the assumptions about children embedded in the texts 
they have found, using the sentence form  
Ignorant and Innocent: 
The Childs of Common Cultural Discourses
—Mavis Reimer and charlie peters
The papers included in this section were originally presented as part of a round table on 
“Theorizing Young People,” hosted by the Association for Research in Cultures of Young 
People (ARCYP) at the Congress of the Social Sciences and Humanities in Fredericton on  
31 May 2011.
Theorizing Young People
89 Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 3.2 (2011) Mavis Reimer and charlie peters
“[c]hildren are ____” and filling in the blank with a 
noun or a predicate adjective. It is at this point that 
students sometimes resist the assignment, protesting 
that texts that report on actual young people should 
not be grouped with texts that discuss abstract children 
or ideas about childhood. Whether the groups decide 
to sort their texts into these subcategories or not, the 
first round of discussions typically results in copious 
lists: children are found to be annoying, beautiful, 
competitive, consumers, creative, dangerous, 
egocentric, gullible, precious, smart, and vulnerable, 
among many other things. In a second round of 
discussions, groups are reorganized and asked to 
study the lists produced by all of the groups, in order 
to consider what positive ideals might underlie some 
of the negative descriptors attached to children and 
to assemble the descriptors into categories. By the 
end of their discussions, most groups have found that, 
with a few exceptions, the assumptions identified 
by the class fall into two broad categories. Groups 
describe these categories in various ways, but the first 
can be summarized as the assumption that children 
are or should be learners, and the second as the 
assumption that children are or should be the best of 
human beings, or alternatively that children represent 
or should represent the best of what it means to be 
human. That both texts about actual young people and 
texts about abstract children work within the same set 
of assumptions leads to a discussion of the ways in 
which ideologies are instantiated in material practices 
and of the regulatory functions of discourse, in this 
case the discourse of “the child.”
The outcome of this classroom activity is not 
surprising, given that there are two dominant 
theoretical frameworks through which “the child” is 
conceptualized in those societies that continue to 
ground their laws, spoken and unspoken, on their 
inheritances from Western European traditions. The first 
of these is a narrative of development from an inferior 
to a superior state: at its barest, this narrative holds that 
young people are ignorant and unknowing subjects 
who will naturally acquire knowledge and grow in 
wisdom as they move toward adulthood. The history 
of this view stretches back at least to classical times, 
although it is common for developmental accounts of 
children’s growth to take the Enlightenment as a point 
of origin. One of the most frequently cited examples is 
from the work of the late-seventeenth-century English 
philosopher John Locke. In Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education, originally a letter written to a friend, Locke 
famously describes the “very little” gentleman’s son 
who is the particular subject of his letter “as white 
Paper, or Wax, to be moulded and fashioned as one 
pleases.” While Locke acknowledges that “there are 
possibly scarce two Children, who can be conducted 
by exactly the same method,” he nevertheless believes 
that young people are enough like one another that 
he can formulate “some general Views” on “the main 
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End and Aims in Education” (261). The story “The Purple Jar” 
by Anglo-Irish writer Maria Edgeworth is a literary example of a 
child character in the process of learning how to be a prudent 
consumer. Rosamond chooses aesthetics (an appealingly purple 
jar to hold flowers) over utility (a pair of new shoes), even though 
her shoes have holes in them. While preparing the new purple jar 
for flowers, she empties it of the water that it contained when she 
purchased it and discovers that it was the colour of the water that 
had made her jar purple. Rosamond ends up with a jar that is no 
longer purple and such dilapidated shoes that her father will not 
take her on an outing. In the end, Rosamond remains uncertain 
about whether or not she will make a better choice next time:  
“I am sure—no not quite sure, but I hope I shall be wiser another 
time” (181). In other words, Rosamond understands herself to  
be a learner, always in the process of moving on to a higher  
state of knowledge.
A fuller account of the establishment of developmentalism as 
a cultural narrative would include the work of Charles Darwin 
on evolution and of Sigmund Freud on the achievement of 
adulthood as the resolution of and progression through oral, anal, 
and phallic stages of psychic life (Rogers and Rogers 178–81). In 
the twentieth century, however, the name most associated with 
the assumption that children’s growth is a continuous process of 
epistemological development is that of Swiss psychologist Jean 
Piaget. For Piaget, the developmental stages of the sensorimotor 
period, the period of concrete operations, and the period of 
formal operations always occur in that order, although children 
can progress more or less rapidly through these stages under 
particular training programs. The destination of development, 
. . . there are two dominant 
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however, is not in doubt: the implicit standard against 
which the child’s progress is measured is the normal, 
rational, social adult subject.
The second dominant theoretical framework 
features an innocent child corrupted by experience. 
Often referred to as the Romantic or Neo-Romantic 
view of “the child,” this second narrative has people 
descend from a superior state of innocence to an 
inferior state of experience during their life journey. The 
literary text most often cited as the touchstone of this 
view of growth as declension is William Wordsworth’s 
“Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of 
Early Childhood”:
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The Soul that rises with us, our life’s Star,
 Hath had elsewhere its setting,
 And cometh from afar:
 Not in entire forgetfulness,
 And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
 From God, who is our home:
Heaven lies about us in our infancy!
Shades of the prison-house begin to close 
 Upon the growing Boy
But He beholds the light, and whence it flows,
 He sees it in his joy;
The Youth, who daily farther from the east
 Must travel, still is Nature’s Priest,
 And by the vision splendid
 Is on his way attended;
At length the Man perceives it die away,
And fade into the light of common day. (58–76)
In her study Romanticism and the Vocation of 
Childhood, Judith Plotz observes that “The Child” 
imagined by many of the major Romantic poets is 
a child no longer enmeshed in a group or a family 
as Rosamond is, but rather splendidly solitary and 
timeless, autonomous and creative, “both source 
and goal of humanity” (31). Central to this view of 
childhood is a privileging of the quality of knowing 
which children are observed to bring to their 
encounters with the world, an intellectual quality  
Plotz describes as “[a]ffective-sensuous unitary 
knowledge” (16). James Barrie’s Peter Pan may stand 
as the best example of this child in the texts of the 
so-called Golden Age of children’s literature, but the 
orphaned, self-sufficient, perceptive heroes of the 
many adventure stories that populate texts for young 
people from the nineteenth century to the present day 
also clearly display many of the characteristics of the 
Romantic child.
In Children and Childhood in Western Society since 
1500, Hugh Cunningham explains that the narratives 
of ascent and descent in which “the child” plays so 
central a role have long shaped understandings of the 
human world and human history in Western societies: 
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“It has . . . been common to imagine the history of 
humankind as equivalent to the life cycle of a human 
being; some societies have seen this as an ascent from 
savagery/childhood to civilization/adulthood, others 
as a descent from primeval innocence/childhood to 
corruption/adulthood” (2). In other words, during 
the span of time that one’s society associates with 
childhood, one might be encouraged to think of oneself 
as ignorant or innocent, primitive or uncivilized. 
During adulthood, one might come to think of oneself 
as wise or corrupt, sophisticated or civilized. Reimer 
has noted elsewhere that nature is the common term in 
both the development and the corruption paradigms; 
she suggests that it is this shared term that enables “the 
imperfect, corporeal, natural child” to exchange places 
readily with “the innocent, spiritual, natural child” 
(8). Within these two common conceptual systems, 
the figures of “the child” and its “adult” companion 
subtend ideas of progress, of degeneration, and of 
value. Good and evil attach themselves either to “the 
(natural) child” or to “the (unnatural) adult,” depending 
on the sets of ideas and the rhetorical purposes in play: 
the evils of ignorance can progress to the goodness of 
wisdom or childhood innocence can degenerate due 
to the corruption that accompanies adulthood. If the 
savage child is noble, then adult civilization is corrupt; 
if adult civilization is noble, the savage child is corrupt. 
Both of these frameworks are frequently seen operating 
simultaneously in current cultural discourses, as 
Reimer’s classes repeatedly discover, yielding intensely 
conflicted and contradictory tropes of “the child.” In 
Henry Jenkins’s words, “the child” is a “semiotically 
adhesive” cultural signifier (15). Given the various 
narratives in circulation, human beings who identify 
with contemporary figurations of “the child” and “the 
adult” are likely to tell themselves stories about their 
own lives that are dominated by the contradictory 
trajectories of ascension and declension.
That the stories of development and of corruption 
are socially constructed narratives is widely 
acknowledged. Historians such as Hugh Cunningham 
and Philippe Ariès have done much to show how ideas 
about young people differ from one time, place, or 
social situation to the next. In Centuries of Childhood: 
A Social History of Family Life, Ariès famously (and 
infamously) argues that “the child” as we know it 
did not exist for the medieval people of France and 
England, but gradually came into being between the 
sixteenth and eighteenth or nineteenth centuries by 
means of two principal changes that correspond to the 
frameworks of an innocent (and therefore corruptible) 
child and of an ignorant (and therefore educable) child. 
Specifically, Ariès argues that, in the medieval period, 
young people joined in the activities of their elders 
as soon as they were weaned. Beginning in the early 
modern period, there came to be a collective belief 
that young people within the family circle should be 
coddled past the age at which they were weaned and 
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the contrasting belief among churchmen, moralists, 
and schoolmasters that young people ought to be 
disciplined, reformed, and made rational (128–33). 
Ariès’s reading of the history of the child and of 
childhood remains controversial, particularly among 
medievalists. As N. Ray Hiner and Joseph M. Hawes 
observe, however, although “Ariès has been justly 
criticized for his selective and sometimes uncritical 
use of evidence, no one has successfully challenged 
his essential point that childhood is not an immutable 
stage of life, free from the influence of historical 
change” (xvi).
Many sophisticated critiques and deconstructions 
of the cultural narratives of developmentalism and 
corruptibility have followed Ariès’s research on the 
historical child. Within literary theory, a significant 
contribution to a deconstruction of the framework of 
childhood innocence has been made by Jacqueline 
Rose in The Case of Peter Pan; or, The Impossibility 
of Children’s Fiction. Drawing on the work of 
Franco-Algerian philosopher Jacques Derrida in Of 
Grammatology, Rose maintains that “[c]hildren’s 
literature brings together two concepts of origin—that 
of language and that of childhood—whose relationship 
it explores” (138) and that, in children’s literature, “the 
child is constantly set up as the site of a lost truth and/
or moment in history, which it can therefore be used to 
retrieve” (43). Rose’s most renowned assertion, made 
on the first page of her book, is that “[c]hildren’s fiction 
is impossible, not in the sense that it cannot be written 
(that would be nonsense), but in that it hangs on an 
impossibility, one which it rarely ventures to speak. 
This is the impossible relation between the adult and 
child” (1). As Rose explains in her 1992 introductory 
essay to the 1993 edition of the book, this relation is 
“impossible” because the concepts of both childhood 
and adulthood are cultural myths; perhaps, indeed, 
they “serve as the last of all myths,” myths that seek “to 
guarantee a certain knowledge of ourselves” (xvii).
James Kincaid also understands childhood 
innocence as a cultural myth that guarantees the 
constitution of the condition of adulthood. In Child-
Loving: The Erotic Child and Victorian Culture, 
Kincaid asserts that “[i]f the child is not distinguished 
from the adult, we imagine that we are seriously 
threatened, threatened in such a way as to put at risk 
our very being, what it means to be an adult in the 
first place” (7). In the process of shoring up the myth 
of capable adulthood, however, according to Kincaid, 
contemporary culture extends a process begun by 
the Victorians and empties childhood of positive 
qualities, leaving the category to embody “a kind of 
purity, an absence and an inability to do” (70). This 
purity and emptiness in turn is eroticized, seen as 
infinitely desirable and irrepressibly alluring. It is this 
construction that Kincaid explores in detail in Erotic 
Innocence: The Culture of Child Molesting, where he 
argues that “we” (by which he generally means Anglo-
94 Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 3.2 (2011)Mavis Reimer and charlie peters
American societies) repeatedly discover and uncover 
cases of child sexual abuse as a way of keeping alive 
the narrative of “a vacant child that is both marginal 
and central to our lives: easily disposed of, abused, 
neglected, abandoned; and yet idealized, treasured, 
adored” (17). While Kincaid in this book focuses 
on the patterns evident in the cultural narratives, he 
also observes that, in its incitement to discourse, the 
figure of the “vacant child” “draws our attention to the 
personal and the psychological, away from structural 
social problems” (12–13).
It is exactly the social and political functions of 
the constructions of childhood innocence that interest 
Robin Bernstein. In Racial Innocence: Performing 
American Childhood from Slavery to Civil Rights, 
Bernstein argues that it was the idea of childhood 
innocence—“itself raced white, itself characterized 
by the ability to retain racial meanings but hide them 
under claims of holy obliviousness”—that “secured 
the unmarked status of whiteness, and the power 
derived from that status, in the nineteenth and into 
the early twentieth centuries” (8). Like Kincaid, 
Bernstein emphasizes the contribution of religious 
discourses not only to the emergence of the dominant 
cultural narrative of the innocent child but also to the 
“doublespeak” it permits (Kincaid, Erotic Innocence 
21). Specifically, according to Bernstein, the Calvinist 
doctrine of original sin (which made “the child” 
the most sinful human subject) was replaced by a 
doctrine of original innocence, but an innocence that 
was understood to be “an active state of repelling 
knowledge” or “achiev[ing] obliviousness” (6). While 
Bernstein does not say so, the Calvinist doctrine of 
original sin and salvation she describes is an extreme 
version of the developmental narrative that understands 
the growth from childish ignorance to adult knowledge 
as progress. We might extrapolate from her argument 
to propose that the version of innocence as achieved 
obliviousness that Bernstein finds subtending the 
racialist paradigm of American society is one in which 
the terms of the two cultural narratives of development 
and corruption are conflated and exchanged: if “the 
child” in this system marks the site of knowledge 
refused, then “the child” is simultaneously the knowing 
and the unknowing subject, at once the “[s]eer blest!” 
of Wordsworth’s poetry (114) and the dim-sighted child 
of Paul’s letter to Corinthian Christians (1 Cor. 13.11–
12). Indeed, it is exactly its dim-sightedness that makes 
its seeing blessed. The educability of the child in this 
developmental narrative is demonstrated, in Bernstein’s 
words, by its “performance of forgetting” (8).
The knowing unknowing child has been identified 
as an important contemporary form of the figure  
of “the child” in a number of recent critiques that  
begin from studies of texts targeted to children. In 
Innocence, Heterosexuality, and the Queerness of 
Children’s Literature, Tison Pugh emphasizes that the 
child’s “innocence depends upon [its] ignorance of 
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sexuality” (7). Classic narratives of children’s literature, however, 
often seek to teach the targeted audience about normative 
heterosexuality: because normative heterosexuality is cultivated 
through prohibitions against homosexual attachments, as cultural 
critic Judith Butler has argued, the child must paradoxically both 
know and not know about sexuality and about the prohibitions 
against homosexual attachments in order to understand the 
normative destinations assumed in the narratives. The child is 
innocent in a queer way, to use Pugh’s terms, because it knows what 
it does not know about sexuality, yet must disavow this unknowing 
knowledge. In The Hidden Adult: Defining Children’s Literature, 
Perry Nodelman argues that it is a key characteristic of texts directed 
to young people to “possess a shadow, an unconscious” (206), a 
shadow that he describes as “the presence of knowledge that a 
text invites its readers to know but pretend not to know” (210). 
Nodelman’s use of the idea of the unconscious suggests that he 
is working with a Freudian model of a layered self in which the 
achievement of functional human subjectivity is a matter of the 
successful sublimation of drives. Kincaid also considers the legacy 
of Freud in his account of “erotic innocence”; in fact, he attributes 
the “contemporary crisis” of eroticization of “the child” to Freud, 
not because Freud saw the infant as a site of polymorphous-perverse 
sexuality but because he retracted this insight by “making sexuality 
merely ‘latent’ in the slightly older child” (Erotic Innocence 15).1 
By doing so, Kincaid maintains, Freud provided “a useful and 
dangerous way of telling one story and living another” (16). Kincaid 
suggests that he is offering his analysis of “erotic innocence” in the 
hope that he can “startle” the existing stories “out of currency” and 
“tease the storytelling into a new territory, find new possibilities” 
The child is innocent in 
a queer way . . . .
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(24), although it is only in the last few pages of his book 
that he proposes some possible “new stories” (280). 
The stories that Kincaid would have us tell are of the 
“laughing child” of Blake and Wordsworth, a happy 
child that we have watched “wander out of our range” 
as we tell our stories about “the anxious, fretting child” 
who is “at risk sexually” (281–82). Kincaid would prefer 
that we tell stories of “a belief in the right to happiness” 
(282), that we tell complex, optimistic, relaxed, stoic, 
tolerant, everyday stories, stories that admit young 
people’s sexuality, “rationalist” stories, stories “of 
healing and happiness,” “stories that aren’t afraid to 
leave home” (282–94).
It was with the challenge of finding new critical 
and theoretical stories about young people that 
we approached the contributors to this forum. 
Deconstructions of existing formulations of “the 
child” abound; thoughtful and detailed accounts of 
the historical development of existing assumptions 
are readily available; critiques of the implications of 
current narratives are regularly produced. Is it possible 
now to move our storytelling to a new territory? What 
other models might be available for theorizing young 
people? What practices of criticism might allow us 
to think beyond the reproduction of the selfsame 
epistemological structures in which “the child” is 
conscripted to play the part of the other to the fully 
human “adult”? The three essays that follow offer 
different answers to these questions.
Loren Lerner’s answer is framed by her experiences 
as an art historian and curator. Through a discussion 
of an exhibition of images of Canadian girls that she 
curated for the McCord Museum in Montreal in 2005, 
Lerner explores the orientations and practices that 
she brings to her work. These importantly include 
recognizing the function of images of children as 
national discourses, focusing on the relationship 
between the seen and the seer, refusing to respect 
canonical generic categories, developing the capacity to 
see from within the period being studied, and working 
to make visible some of the narratives that have been 
marginalized by the authorized narratives of history. 
Rather than articulating a new method, Lerner ends her 
essay with an affirmation of the possibilities of patient 
and persistent study, agreeing with historian T. J. Clark 
that “astonishing things happen if one gives oneself over 
to the process of seeing again and again.”
Nat Hurley begins from her attachment to 
children’s literature as a queer theorist to propose that 
perversion, as an effect that originates at the centre of 
the normative, is a heuristic that could be much more 
productively used by theorists and critics of texts for 
young people. In her essay, she explores several possible 
ways forward: a focus on the participation of these texts 
in producing queer childhoods and queer theory; a 
focus on the gender and genre transgressions of texts for 
young people; and a focus on queer child readers and 
the narratives that they take up and recirculate. Hurley 
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concludes by suggesting that it is the persistence of 
the narratives of normative development that “the next 
wave” of queer theorizing about texts for young people 
needs to address.
Claudia Ruitenberg writes as a philosopher of 
education. Beginning from a summary of twentieth-
century critiques of the “rational autonomous subject” 
as the end of human development, Ruitenberg observes 
that, if this subject is now understood to be a fiction, 
it is no longer possible to think of education as the 
task of turning young people into rational autonomous 
subjects “as expediently as possible.” In the remainder 
of her essay, Ruitenberg works through the question 
of how schooling might be reconceptualized if it were 
thought through Derrida’s “ethic of hospitality.” Among 
her interesting conclusions is that “mass schooling as 
social institution cannot be run based on the principle 
of unconditional hospitality.”
In our scan of the existing critiques on the dominant 
cultural narratives of the ignorant child who develops 
into the rational adult and the innocent child who 
is corrupted by entry into the adult world, we found 
that most recent critiques focus on the narrative 
of innocence and corruptibility. On the one hand, 
this focus may suggest that it is this narrative that is 
central to current cultural structures and systems. 
On the other hand, the fact that critics and theorists 
are able to trace the history and parse the terms of 
the “doublespeak” of knowing unknowingness may 
suggest that the force of this formulation is no longer 
hegemonic. There appear to be fewer deconstructions 
of “the child” of developmentalism, perhaps because 
most critics of childhood and culture work within 
academic institutions and themselves have significant 
investments in the educability of young people. Two 
notable exceptions come from the field of queer theory 
and are discussed by Hurley in her essay in this section: 
Kathryn Bond Stockton’s exploration of the “sideways 
movements that attend all children, however we deny 
it” (3), and Lee Edelman’s argument that “the image 
of the Child” has been used to impose the logic of 
what he calls “reproductive futurism” as the limit to 
every political debate (2). Notably, too, both Hurley 
and Ruitenberg point to the narratives of normative 
development as the ones that most urgently need to  
be rethought if older people wish to understand  
younger people as full participants in the world we 
share with them.
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